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THE NEED FOR REGULATION OF
AIR AMBULANCE SERVICES
D. PAUL DALTON
N JULY OF 1977, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR)
to amend Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to establish standards for Air Ambulance Services.! These proposals would
apply not only to those Part 135 registrants who hold themselves
out to the public as operating air ambulances,' but also to every
Part 135 certificate holder who carries any patient." The stated
purpose of these regulations is to establish definitive standards for
air ambulances3 regardless of whether the aircraft is so characterized. This all-encompassing application is "predicated not only on
the personal safety of the person being carried, but also on the
risk of inflight emergencies that could occur if the aircraft does
not have proper medical equipment and personnel."" This will
prevent a certificate holder from avoiding compliance merely by
not advertising itself to be an air ambulance." The proposed regulations would establish separate criteria for general, intensive care
and rescue air ambulance services.' This article will examine the
scope of these proposed regulations and consider whether they
adequately meet the problems of providing air ambulance services.
142 Fed. Reg. 37,825 (1977)

(to be codified in 14 C.F.R.

S

135) [hereinafter

cited as Proposed Regulations].

I For the purpose of this discussion, Part 135 registrants or certificate holders
means persons whose operations are regulated under 14 C.F.R. S 135 (1978).
These rules govern (among other things): "The carrying in air commerce by any
person, other than an air carrier, of persons or property for compensation or hire
(commercial operations) in small aircraft; and . . . each person who is on
board an aircraft being operated under this part." Id. at 135.1(a)(3) and (4).
3 Id. at 37,825.
4"Patient" is defined in proposed § 135.283(b)(5) as "a person who is sick,
injured, wounded, or otherwise incapacitated or helpless." Id. at 37,826-27.

7

Id. at 37,825.
I1d. at 37,825-26.
ld. at 37,826.

'Id.at 37,826.
Id. at 37,826-28.
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I.

THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS

A. The FAA Proposal
The basic format of the regulations would be additive, that is,
the minimum required equipment and services for all levels of
air ambulance care would be set forth under proposed § 135.285."
If a certificate holder knows that a patient will need intensive
care or life support measures while aboard the aircraft, § 135.287
(Intensive Care Air Ambulance Service) would require that the
aircraft contain all items listed in § 135.285 and additionally that
there be a medical attendant" aboard assigned only to that patient."
Moreover, § 135.291 would prohibit providing intensive care air
ambulance service "unless a physician is available, either in person
or by telephone or radio communication, to advise the certificate
holder with regard to the transportation of the patient.""
Any aircraft used for rescue air ambulance service would, under
§ 135.289 (Rescue Air Ambulance Service), be required to contain the equipment necessary for intensive care air ambulance
service' as well as an auxiliary medical oxygen unit" and a poison
kit." Furthermore, at least one medical attendant would be re'Minimum requirements would include a basic stock of: plastic trash bags,
flashlight, batteries, and disposable face masks. Additionally, a blanket and a pillow would be required for each patient. A third category of basic equipment is
designated as required only when the certificate holder knows or has reason to
know that such equipment may be needed by the patient. Under § 135.285(c),
this equipment would include litters, locking hooks for intravenous packages,
ventilation units or resuscitators, emesis basins, urinals, bedpans, sphygmomanometers, medical oxygen units, and portable suction units. Id. at 37,827.
"Medical attendant is defined in § 135.283(b)(6) as "a physician, registered
nurse, registered physician's assistant, or a person either registered by the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians or certified by a State, territory or possession of the United States as meeting standards acceptable to the
Administrator." Id. at 37,827.
" Id. at 37,827.

13/d. at 37,828.
'An exception is that the requirement of a specific medical oxygen unit and
a portable suction unit would not apply unless there were an anticipated need
of such for the patient. Id. at 37,827-28.
"Standards for a "medical oxygen unit" would be different from those for an
"auxiliary medical oxygen unit." The standards for each would appear in 14
C.F.R. 5 135.295. Id. at 37,828.
' Additionally, the aircraft would be required to have the following equipment
readily available but on board only if necessary to meet the anticipated needs
of the patient: sterile obstetrical kit, padded boards, specific splints for legs and
arms, backboards, traction splints, and sterile burn sheets. Id. at 37,828.
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quired to be aboard any aircraft used for rescue air ambulance
service.1"
In addition to the requirements for each category of air ambulance service, the proposed regulations would establish the follow-

ing: continuing minimum educational requirements for medical
attendants, 8 regulations regarding the specifications, use and placement of litters in the aircraft," regulations for carriage" and maintenance'1 of medical equipment and supplies, aircraft interior lighting and electrical power supply requirements,' requirements for
an air ambulance manual' and for an emergency medical care
kit.' An emergency clause allows a certificate holder to deviate

from the proposed regulations if there is a medical emergency and
no other practicable means of transportation is reasonably available.' This deviation would then have to be reported in detail to
the FAA Flight Standards District Office within ten days.'
B. Reactions To The Proposal
The FAA's move to consider regulation of air ambulance serv"Proposed Regulations S 135.289(c). Id. at 37,828.
"Every person to serve as a medical attendant on an air ambulance under
the proposed regulations must have received training within the preceding 12
months in attendant responsibilities, airway obstruction, pulmonary arrest and
resuscitation, bleeding and shock, wound care, fractures of the upper and lower
extremities, injuries of the head, face, neck and spine, injuries of the eye, chest,
abdomen, pelvis and genitalia, childbirth and care of newborn infants, lifting and
moving patients and environmental emergencies. Proposed Regulations S 135.293.
Id. at 37,828.
"Proposed Regulations 5 135.299. Litter Patients.Id. at 37,828.
Proposed Regulations 5 135.301. Carriage of Medical Equipment. Id. at
37,828.
" Proposed Regualtions § 135.303. Maintenance of Medical Equipment and
Supplies. Id. at 37,828.
"Proposed Regulations 5 135.305. Aircraft Requirements. Id. at 37,828.
Proposed Regulations 5 135.307. Manual Requirement. This would include:
identification of responsibilities and persons charged with same, patient handling
procedures, flight crew members' responsibilities to patients and emergency procedures. Id. at 37,828.
' Proposed Regulations § 135.297. Emergency Medical Care Kit. Every certificate holder's aircraft carrying any patient would be required to be equipped
with a kit meeting the specifications proposed as Appendix B to 14 C.F.R. § 135.
These include first aid items such as gauze dressings and pads, adhesive tape,
scissors, tongue depressors, ammonia inhalants, eye covers, constricting bands,
airways, triangular bandages and mouth gags. Id. at 37,828-29.
Proposed Regulations § 135.309. Medical Emergencies. Id. at 37,828.
'9 Proposed Regulations § 135.309(b). Id. at 37,828.
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ices has sparked varied, but generally favorable, reactions." Equipment manufacturers have been understandably supportive, because
specific items of equipment would be required which those companies could supply." The Aerospace Medical Association is

strongly in favor of the concept of regulation, although its proposal
contained some material differences from that of the FAA.2
Specifically, the Aerospace Medical Association's proposal would
have applied only to those Part 135 certificate holders who hold

themselves out as Air Ambulance Operators.' This particular element was expressly rejected by the FAA 1 and has been character-

ized as essentially an attempt at industry advertising restrictions.'
In other areas, the Aerospace Medical Association proposal would
require: greater educational requirements for medical attendants,'

air ambulance responsibility for patient ground transportation between the air ambulance and the hospitals,"' codification of specific procedures peculiar to air transportation of patients,' more
27Another type of reaction to the regulations has arisen within the government itself. There has been speculation about the authority of the FAA to issue
such regulations. Specifically, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) may claim authority over air ambulances as health care providers and
urge that the FAA's authority over flight safety would therefore not extend to
air ambulance standards. Telephone conversation with Mr. Gubler, FAA Flight
Standards, Washington, D.C. (July 6, 1978). Although the outcome of such a
Cabinet-level struggle is unknown, it is submitted by this author that the extent
of regulation, if assumed by HEW, would be greater than that proposed by the
FAA. This postulation is based on the nature of the FAA as an agency generally considered to be primarily concerned with the impact of a program on the
air industry and secondarily with the impact on the "public good." See note 32
infra. This is in opposition to the pervasive program inclinations of the HEW,
such as Medicaid and Medicare, which tend to subordinate the interests of industries and professions to the "public good" of the social program in question.
'Telephone
interview with Henry Felhouse, President of First Ambulance
Center of Tennessee (July 7, 1978). This company supplies equipment for land
ambulances and is interested in the proposed regulations as possibly establishing
a new market for their services and equipment.
" Resolution Proposed by the Aviation Safety Committee, Aerospace Medical
Association, adopted May 10, 1977, at the Annual Business Meeting held in Las
Vegas, Nevada (1977) [hereinafter cited as Aerospace Medical Association Resolution].
'Id. at 3.
31 Proposed Regulations, supra note 1, at 37,825-26.
32Interview with Bill Block, President of Alpha Aviation, Inc., in Dallas, Texas
(July 11, 1978).
'Aerospace Medical Association Resolution, supra note 29, at 4.
3Id. at 5.
"3See, e.g., id. This would include prohibition of intravenous fluids in glass
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extensive basic air ambulance equipment, ' specific life support
and electronic monitoring equipment for Intensive Care Air Ambulance Service, ' higher standards for medical oxygen units,"

pressurized cabins for critical care patients,"9 non-smoking regulations,' special fueling requirements when patient onboard,"1 special
air ambulance flight plan codes with FAA priority, ' five-year
maintenance of patient records,' and filing of medical incidence

reports with the FAA."
Most of these items and services are currently being used by

large air ambulance services. ' At least one such company has even
gone beyond both the FAA and the Aerospace Medical Association
proposed standards to develop and equip their air ambulances with
modular care units.' Moreover, they maintain an on-call staff of
specially trained, critical care unit (CCU) experienced, registered
nurses. 7
bottles, indwelling retention balloon devices using expandable filling media such
as air, etc.
This would include almost all of the items required in the FAA proposal
for Rescue Air Ambulance Service, including the Emergency Medical Kit items, as
well as many other items including emergency medications. Id. at 5-6.
" The equipment required would be a cardiac monitor with tapewriter and
supplies, defibrillator with supplies, electric and portable suction units and supplies, nasogastric tube, aspirating syringe and one critical care registered nurse for
each intensive care patient. Id. at 6-7. Critical care registered nurse is defined
as a Registered Nurse with at least two years experience in critical care nursing.
Id. at 4.
" Each unit would be required to supply 60 minutes of oxygen rather than
20 minutes as proposed by the FAA. Id. at 7.
"'Id. at 8.
4 No smoking would be permitted in the aircraft at any time, nor could
anyone smoke within 50 feet of it when on the ground. Id.
41Id.
2

Id.

4 Id.

"Complete reports would be filed following an in-flight death or any significant patient deterioration which required alteration of the flight plan. Id.
I Interview with Alice Gaul, Head Flight Nurse, Alpha Aviation, Inc., in
Dallas, Texas (July 11, 1978) (taped).
' Alpha Aviation, Inc. has developed an "Airborne Critical Care Unit" which
includes the stretcher, cardiac monitor, defibrillator, oxygen supply, sphygmomanometer, intravenous fluid hangers, suction, ventilators, and power supply in one
unit. The patient is placed in the unit at the hospital and then the entire unit is
placed onto the aircraft. This reduces the possibility of trauma or aggravation of
injury to the patient. Id.
47 Id.
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In its decision not to include these elements of the Aerospace
Medical Association proposal in its proposed regulations, the FAA
may have balanced cost considerations against the ideals desired
by the involved health professions. Nevertheless, the FAA standards still would be expensive to implement." The required costs
would likely be beyond the means of small rural air taxi certificate
holders. Moreover, the aircraft necessary to carry the amount of
equipment required would be too large to land at many small rural
airstrips,"9 thus either denying these areas the benefits of air ambulance services or forcing certificate holders to turn to more expensive aircraft with low takeoff and landing requirements.
For certificate holders in areas without a substantial demand for
air ambulance services, there is the additional problem of aircraft
utilization. The proposed regulations do not state whether the
aircraft would have to remain constantly equipped for air ambulance service. Such a requirement could preclude an aircraft's
use for other air taxi functions or at the very least, significantly
reduce its passenger and cargo carrying capacity due to the
substantial aircraft modifications which would be necessary." As
a practical matter, therefore, the certificate holder would have to
keep one aircraft out of regular service for the sole purpose of
handling air ambulance calls. In areas where the demand for air
ambulance service is low, this situation could either cause the
certificate holder to abandon his program entirely or to charge an
inordinately high rate for air ambulance services.
In the event that the FAA decides to promulgate the regulations
for air ambulance services, United States Senator George McGovern
has drafted and will submit to Congress a bill to establish a financial
assistance program for small certificate holders for acquisition of
"It is estimated that the cost of equipping an aircraft to meet the proposed
FAA regulations could be as much as $20,000 and that the cost of modifying the
aircraft to accept the required equipment could be as much as $17,500. Letter
from Frank M. Drew, Executive Director of the South Dakota Hospital Association to United States Senator George McGovern (June 16, 1978).
4

0

Id.

50 id.

11Telephone interview with Robin Carpenter, Assistant to United States Senator George McGovern (June 7, 1978).
5

2 Id.
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the necessary equipment.' The bill will provide for grants to
emergency medical facilities to purchase required equipment to be
used by those small air ambulance services which would otherwise
be unable to purchase such equipment." The equipment would be
owned and maintained by the facility and loaned on request and
without charge to the specified air ambulance services." The funds
to be appropriated for this program would be $200,000." Because
of the high cost of outfitting the aircraft for air ambulance service,
this amount has been questioned as being inadequate and should
probably be increased."' The principle of the legislation, however,
would strike at the heart of the only strong opposition to the regulations-cost."
Considering the expense of medical equipment in relation to the
expansive proposals of the Aerospace Medical Association, the
FAA's proposed regulations are a realistic compromise, both economically and professionally. When supplemented by Senator McGovern's legislation, quality ambulance services should be readily
available throughout the country. These equipment and service
regulations alone, however, may sow the seeds of destruction for
the very services they are intended to standardize. Specifically, no
mention has yet been made of how air ambulance services are to
fit into the health care system in relation to the current problems
of liability for malpractice and negligence.
II. LIABILITY BASED ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE

Before considering the malpractice implications of the proposed
regulations, the effect they would have on negligence actions in
general should first be analyzed." In an action against an air ambu'a Draft of A Bill To Authorize Assistance to Small Air Ambulance Operators
in Acquiring Necessary Medical Equipment by Senator George McGovern. Received with a letter from Robin Carpenter, Assistant to United States Senator
George McGovern (July, 1978).
" Id. at 3.
5 Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Io
' Letter from Frank M. Drew, supra note 48.
"Telephone Interview with Robin Carpenter, supra note 51.
5"This article is not concerned with the potential liability of an owner-lessor
for the acts of a lessee who may be operating an air ambulance service. For a
discussion of these problems see Hilliker, Vicarious Liability for Aircraft Owners
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lance service for negligence in which no federal or state safety
regulations exist, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to establish
four basic elements. First, he must show a duty requiring the air
ambulance service to conform to a certain standard of care."
Second, he must show a failure to conform to that duty on the
part of the air ambulance service. 1 The third and fourth required
elements are a causal connection and actual loss or damage.'
When a statute regulating the activities of the defendant is in
effect, however, the first two elements, duty and breach, may be
established as a matter of law." Under these circumstances, the
trier of fact is left to decide only whether the requisite causal connection existed between the established breach of the defendant
and the plaintiff's alleged damages and whether in fact there were
actual damages. This concept is referred to as negligence per se.
If, therefore, a statute were passed regulating air ambulance
services and an action against an air ambulance service subsequently arose which involved a failure to comply with the statute,
the courts of most states would treat it as an action based on negligence per se. If it were established that the statute was violated,
those courts could find negligence as a matter of law and move
directly to the factual issues of damages and causal relationship."
In some states, however, violation of a statute is treated as only
evidence of negligence, leaving the jury to decide negligence as a
fact issue." California, moreover, has taken a different approach
Under State Laws, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 1031 (1977) and Note, Nebraska Aeronautical Law: Liability of Aircraft Owner-Lessor to Injured Third Parties, 11
CREIGHTEN L. REV. 352 (1977).
"W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
01

6 d.at 143.
e1 ld. at 143.

Id. at 200.
" See, e.g., Richardson v. Gregory, 281 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1960); White v.

Peters, 52 Wash. 2d 824, 329 P.2d 471 (1958); Somerville v. Keeler, 165 Miss.
244, 145 So. 721 (1933); Riser v.Smith, 136 Minn. 417, 162 N.W. 520 (1917);
Conrad v. Springfield Consolidated Ry. Co., 240 Il.

12, 88 N.E. 180 (1909);

Cleveland, C. C. & I. Ry. v. Harrington, 131 Ind. 426, 30 N.E. 37 (1892).
"*See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Norvick Transfer Co., 274 F.2d 916

(4th Cir. 1960) (discussing Maryland law); Gill v. Whiteside-Hemby Drug Co.,
197 Ark. 425, 122 S.W.2d 597 (1938); Guinan v. Famous Players Lasky Corp.,
267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 (1929); Chiapparine v. Public Service Ry. Co.,

91 N.J.L. 581, 103 A. 180 (1918). See also PROSSER, supra note 60, at 201.
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and treats a violation of a statute as creating merely a rebuttable
presumption of negligence." Regardless of which of these methods
is used, violation of a statute will usually place a much greater
burden on the defendant.
Questions remain, however, as to whether the same state court
results will occur when it is a regulation promulgated by a federal
administrative agency rather than a statute which is violated. The
answer generally appears to be in the affirmative, qualified only
by the requirements (generally applicable to state and federal
statutes as well) that the regulation was intended to prevent the
harm which is being complained of and that the plaintiff was within
the class of persons intended to be protected by the regulation."7
More specifically, FAA regulations have provided the foundation
for successful negligence actions in states such as Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, Washington and Minnesota." Furthermore, in California, where statutory violations raise only a
presumption of negligence, at least one court has combined the
negligence per se presumption with concepts of comparative negligence ' to produce a conceptual morass.
It is apparent that the mere existence of the regulations will
have an appreciable impact on the potential liability of air ambulance services for injuries to patients. This is so even without
regard to overt acts of negligence by the air ambulance service or
its agents. When an overt act does occur, rather than merely alleg"See, e.g., Saterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d
279 (1947). See also PROSSER, supra note 60, at 201.
"7PROSSER, supra note 60, at 192-97.
68See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1977)
(Mass.); Hurnziker v. Scheidemantle, 543 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1976) (Penn.);
Bibler v. Young, 492 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1974) (Ohio); Arney v. United States,
479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973) (Calif.); Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp.
471 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp.
67 (D. Minn. 1963).
69Rudelson v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
In this
case a violation by U.S. Government personnel of an FAA safety regulation
concerning air traffic control systems was found to constitute negligence per se.
Each of three pilots was also found by the trier of fact to be negligent. The complexity arises in that the trier of fact is required to determine the proportional
allocation of negligence between the person whose negligence was established
as a matter of law by the court and the other parties whose negligence was
established as a matter of fact. This overlap clouds the division of duties between
the court and the trier of fact in negligence per se cases.
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ing negligence per se, a plaintiff might elect to pursue a malpractice
claim.
III. MALPRACTICE PROBLEMS OF AIR AMBULANCE SERVICES

Prior to the movement for regulation, carriers providing air
ambulance services were generally regarded by health care professionals and the public as being analogous to "good samaritans."'"
Of course, given the opportunity, courts would probably have
treated air ambulances as any land ambulance service for purposes
of negligence or malpractice liability. But apparently because of
this general sentiment, as well as questions of medical responsibility, no cases have yet been decided involving liability for the
well-being of a patient in an air ambulance.
By establishing minimum standards for equipment and services,
the FAA may unintentionally be exacerbating the problem of
the proliferation of medical malpractice litigation which exists in
many courts. These minimum standards may well lay the predicate
for a "minimum standard of care" to be used as the basis for
malpractice claims against air ambulances. An understanding of
the reasons for this hypothesis will require an examination of:
first, the way in which land ambulances have traditionally been
treated in cases of negligence; second, the possible allocation of
responsibility between involved health care professionals and land
ambulance services; and finally, whether these relationships would
continue for air ambulance services.
A. Traditional Ambulance Services
Ambulance services have been categorized as an anomaly in
that, although they may or may not be classified as common carriers, they are neither taxi services nor hospitals,' but something
in between the two categories." Those questions involving ordinary negligence in providing non-professional services, such as
mere transportation, have been clear-cut. Ordinary negligence, if
proven, is generally actionable.' Thus, in the common carrier or
taxicab-like cases, recovery may be allowed against the ambulance
Interview with Bill Block, supra note 32.

70

11Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d

Id. at 912.

72
3

7 Id.

910, 911-12 (1950).
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service predicated on ordinary negligence,' even if the ambulance

belongs to a charitable institution." Moreover, ordinary negligence
is the usual standard of conduct for ambulance attendants in
transporting the patient to and from the vehicle."

More difficult questions may arise, however, concerning the
standard of professional health care due the patient by the ambulance service. As ambulance services undertake, or are required, to
provide a greater degree of care to the patient, the nature of their

liability begins to approach that of a hospital." Just as hospitals
are no longer considered to be mere providers of beds and basic

services," ambulances are assuming a responsibility greater than
just safe driving and the proper loading and unloading of patients."9
Therefore, when an ambulance service employs trained medical

personnel,' the ambulance service may be held liable for the acts
and omissions of these skilled persons under the doctrine of "respondeat superior."'" Liability could arise, for example, in rescue

and accident situations wherein the ambulance is called to the
scene by non-medical personnel and the attendants have no contact with a physician. Liability for the ambulance service may
74

See Reliable Transfer Co. v. May, 70 Ga. App. 613, 29 S.E.2d 187 (1944);
Mock v. McCook Bros. Funeral Home, 193 So. 232 (La. App. 1939); Mussman
v. Steele, 126 Neb. 353, 253 N.W. 347 (1934); Leete v. Griswold Post, A.L., 114
Conn. 400, 158 A. 919 (1932).
'5Sheehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28
(1937).
7
6Hollander v. Smith & Smith, 10 N.J. Super. 82, 76 A.2d 697 (1950);
Walker v. Joseph P. Geddes Funeral Serv., Inc., 33 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 1948).
See also McCormick v. Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn, 28 App. Div. 2d 1034, 283
N.Y.S. 737 (1935).
" Cf. Brook v. Vancil, 340 Ill. App. 432, 92 N.E.2d 526 (1950) (where
infant patient was burned by defective incubator in ambulance, fact that incubator was owned and maintained by the state and under the direct supervision of
hospital-employed nurse at time of fire precluded finding of liability for the
ambulance based on doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because ambulance service or
its employees had neither management nor control of the incubator.)
" Cf. Garcia v. Clifford Jackson Funeral Homes, 526 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex.
157 (1978).
79 Cf. Garcia v. Clifford Jackson Funeral Homes, 526 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ) (quoting testimony discussing degree
of care for ambulance attendants).
I These might include nurses, emergency medical technicians, ordinary ambulance attendants or others.
s1Cf. Ficarra, The Hospital Emergency Room and the Law, 12 CALIF. W. L.
REv. 223, 230 (1976) (hospital liable along with nurse in charge of emergency
room in absence of physician in charge).
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continue, however, even in those situations in which a physician
has instructed the ambulance attendants as to the specific care to
be given to a specific patient before departure or when a physician
is in, or in communication with, the ambulance.
B. Liability Allocation Theories
There are several different theories used by state courts to allocate liability between a hospital, its employee, and the physician
where the patient's injury results from an act or omission of the
employee. Depending on the jurisdiction, the liability may fall
totally on the physician, totally on the hospital, or on the physician
with provisions for indemnity against the hospital.
When the physician takes command of or controls the patient's
care in an ambulance, his responsibility, and thus his liability, is
the same as if he were performing an operation in a hospital assisted by a surgical team" or if he were on call in a hospital emergency room." Although he has primary responsibility, and thus
liability, those same theories of liability allocation between physicians and hospitals might be used to exculpate or find liability
for either him or an ambulance service.
1. Borrowed Servant Doctrine
The oldest of these doctrines is that of the "borrowed servant.""'
This is a permutation of the doctrine of "respondeat superior" in
that it finds liability for a "master" based on the actions of a
"servant." It distinguishes, however, between a "general master"
(hospital) and a "special master" (physician). When the servant
is under the control of or subject to the right of control of the
special master, the special, but not the general, master is responsible for the negligent acts of the servant." In its most frequent
application, the servant is a hospital employee assigned to assist
a physician, usually in a surgical procedure. The factual question
82 See Payne and Mayes, Vicarious Liability and the Operating Room Surgeon,
17 S. TEX. L. REV. 367 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Payne and Mayes] and
Payne, Recent Developments Aflecting a Hospital's Liability for Negligence of
Physicians, 18 S. TEX. L. REV. 389 (1977).
"3See Holman, Emergency Room Care, 188 J.A.M.A. 1165 (1964), quoted
in Ficarra, The Hospital Emergency Room and the Law, supra note 81, at 239-40.
"See Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 P. 752 (1923).
"Payne and Mayes, supra note 82, at 373-74.
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presented is whether the hospital has surrendered control or the
right to control to the physician. If it has, vicarious liability
attaches to the physician. " Under the "borrowed servant" doctrine,
"right to control" has generally been construed as an immediate
right of control."" "Immediate" means some realistic connection of
the physician in time or place with the acts for which he is to be
held responsible." At the same time, it is recognized that when the
physician is exercising actual control and direction over the servant, even though the physician is not physically present, the "borrowed servant" doctrine will still impute liability to the physician."
The implications of the "borrowed servant" doctrine for the
ambulance service are predictable. If the physician is physically
present in the ambulance and in control of the attendants regarding the patient's care, he and not the ambulance service would be
held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the attendants.
This is analogous to the operating room surgeon and the assistants
working under his supervision. Although technically employed by
the hospital, the assistant is considered to be the "borrowed servant" of the surgeon. For that reason, the surgeon is held liable
for the assistant's negligent acts. Thus with a physician present and
in command, the ambulance service probably would be exculpated.
If the physician maintained continuous radio or telephone supervision of the patient's care by the attendants, his physical absence
would not preclude a finding of immediate control and, as outlined above, liability would again fall on the physician, not on
the ambulance service, for the negligent acts of the attendants
under his supervision.
When, however, the absent physician merely gives general care
instructions to the attendants prior to departure, or even signs
standing orders,' the attendant's situation becomes more analogous
Id. at 380.
at 374.
1,"Id. at 374, 376.
"Id. at 376. It is not really clear whether the doctor was originally singled
out over the hospital because he was actually in complete control or whether it
was because most hospitals at that time enjoyed charitable immunity.
90Standing orders are usually a form listing procedures to follow if the
patient begins to develop certain symptoms. Although specific procedures are
listed, the, determination of when to start such procedures is, within general
parameters, left up to the nurse or attendant. See ALPHA AVIATION, INC., MEDICAL
17 Id.
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to that of a hospital's nurse who negligently executes a doctor's
orders for a patient's care. In such a case, the physician has directed an act, but he has not directed or supervised the method of
performance nor did he have an immediate right to control such
performance. Under these circumstances, the hospital (ambulance)
has not actually surrendered right of control to the physician,
even though he is available to advise the nurse (ambulance attendant) by telephone (radio) whenever the nurse (ambulance attendant) chooses to seek such advice."1 Until that physician is so contacted and assumes control of the situation, he lacks the requisite
connection of either time or place upon which the "borrowed servant" doctrine would predicate his liability."
2. "CaptainOf The Ship" Doctrine

A second concept for allocation of liability is known as the
"captain of the ship" doctrine.' Based on the "borrowed servant"
doctrine, it holds the physician vicariously liable for the acts of
all persons under his control. Because his right to control is complete, he is analogized to a ship's captain and the operating room
and assistants to the ship and its crew. This doctrine differs from
the "borrowed servant" concept in that the physician's liability may
continue in his absence, even when he is exercising no control over
the servant whatsoever." At the same time, the hospital is exculpated from liability as having surrendered control of the "ship"
to the "captain."'
The impact of this doctrine upon the ambulance service is clear.
The ambulance service needs either to have a physician sign a
list of general standing orders for attendants to execute, or to advise the physician of the particular patient and secure his agreeat 32-36 (Flight nurse training manual used by
Alpha Aviation, Inc., Dallas, Texas).
9" See Note, Borrowed Servant Doctrine Rather Than Captain of the Ship
Doctrine Determines Vicarious Liability of Surgeon in Operating Room in Texas,
TRAINING PROGRAM MANUAL

9 TEx. TEcH. L.

REV.

199, 202 (1977).

Payne and Mayes, supra note 82, at 374.
"See McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949). This case
is generally considered to be the birthplace of the "Captain of the Ship" doctrine.
T
Yorkton v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).
"Note, Borrowed Servant Doctrine Rather Than Captain of the Ship Doctrine Determines Vicarious Liability of Surgeon in Operating Room in Texas,
supra note 91, at 203.
92
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ment to be available for any radio call from the ambulance. If this
is done, the physician will be the recipient of the vicarious liability,
not the ambulance service itself.
Unfortunately for the ambulance services, use of the "captain of
the ship" doctrine is diminishing." Although it is still recognized,
the scope of its application varies such that, as a practical matter,
its result may be unpredictable in those jurisdictions which still
use it.""
3. Other Theories

Some jurisdictions have modified the concept of the "borrowed
servant" doctrine. One modification would require indemnification" by the general master for liability predicated on the unfitness
of the servant provided. Another would impose a responsibility
on the special master for the "finished product" while excusing
him from liability for the servant's acts over which he had no real
control.
The "indemnification" concept deals with the relationship between the two masters. The theory is that the hospital (ambulance)
owes the physician a duty to provide him with assistants (ambulance attendants) skilled and competent to perform the specific
task. 8 If the physician proves that the active, or primary, negligence was that of the assistant provided by the hospital (ambulance), imdemnification may lie against the hospital (ambulance)
for the passive, or secondary, liability of the physician. The gravamen of this theory is that, as in the "borrowed servant" doctrine,
the physician is still held liable as the special master over the
ambulance attendant. However, if the physician can prove that
the active negligence was that of the attendant and that the ambulance service owed him a duty to furnish a qualified attendant, the
physician is entitled to indemnity from the ambulance service for
damages assessed against him based on his vicarious liability for
the acts of that attendant. This would be true even if the physican
9"Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977). See also Note,
"Captain of the Ship" Doctrine--OperatingSurgeon Is Not Automatcially Liable

for Assistant's Negligence, 9 ST. MARY's L. J. 159 (1977) and Payne and Mayes,
supra note 82, at 384-87.
97
Pennsylvania may be the only state which still recognizes this doctrine.
Payne and Mayes, supra note 82, at 386.
91Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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were present in the ambulance." The result would be total, not
shared, liability for the ambulance service.
The "finished product" theory blunts the "borrowed servant"
doctrine but imposes a burden on the physician analogous to that
of inspection of a finished product. The "borrowed servant" doctrine is weakened by the practical recognition that a mistake may
be made by the servant which is not discoverable by the physician
even in the exercise of reasonable supervision.'" Under such circumstances, the physician's duty is to exercise reasonable care in
supervising the servant. 1 Having fulfilled that responsibility, the
vicarious liability for the acts of the servant will return to the
general master-the hospital. However, an additional duty is imposed on the physician to exercise that reasonable supervision
throughout the entire procedure. Assume, for example, that a
surgeon leaves the operating room after surgery but before he
has verified that the patient is breathing properly. His failure to
remain and exercise reasonable care in supervising the assistants
until the patient is breathing properly will result, under this theory,
in his vicarious liability for the negligent acts of the assistants,
whether otherwise discoverable or not." '
The result of this "finished product" doctrine would be that if
the physician exercises reasonable care in supervising the attendants, the vicarious liability for the undiscoverable acts of the attendants falls on the ambulance service. On the other hand, if the
physician has assumed control and supervision of the attendants,
he may not relinquish that control until the procedure (safe transportation of the patient) is completed, on penalty of full vicarious
liability. In such event, the ambulance service would be exculpated.
C. Liability For Air Ambulances
Under the proposed regulations, air ambulances would feel the
"Such indemnity is possible even when both the physician and the assistant
are working simultaneously within the same surgical cavity in a patient. Id.
oo For example, a nurse negligently left a sponge in a patient's body. Before
closing the cavity, the physician asked for a sponge count and was told by the
nurse that it was correct. He additionally made a visual inspection of the
operating field. The court held that no more was required of him unless a
sponge was known to be missing. Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930).
I" See Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 313 N.E.2d
255, 261 (1974).
102Id. at 261-62.
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impact of each of these theories more severely than land ambulance services. The category of patients (intensive care) required
to have the most attention1" is also the only category which involves the physician as a requirement.1 ' Furthermore, that involvement only goes to the physician's being "available, either in person or by telephone or radio communication, to advise ... with
regard to the transportation of the patient."'"
The implications of this provision in terms of liability for the
air ambulance service could be substantial and would vary in
interstate travel. If the physician assumed active control and supervision by radio of the management of the patient, under the "borrowed servant" and "captain of the ship" doctrines he would be
solely liable for the acts of the medical attendants (aiy ambulance
exculpated). Under the "indemnification" theory, the physician
would be vicariously liable, but the ambulance service might be
made to indemnify him (air ambulance service exculpated only if
the primary negligence was that of the attendant). Finally, under
the "finished product" concept, the physician would be only vicariously liable for whatever acts might be discoverable by reasonable
supervision,' unless he terminated that supervision before the trip
was concluded (air ambulance might be exculpated).
If, however, the physician did not assume actual control and
supervision, but merely remained "available," only the "captain
of the ship" doctrine would impose vicarious liability on the physician. Because the "borrowed servant" requires an immediate
right of control not present under such circumstances, it would
not free the ambulance service of liability. As the "finished product"
and "indemnification" theories are also predicated upon the immediate right of control, they also would be of no avail to the air
ambulance service in this situation. Under these last three concepts, however, if the attendant exercised the option of contacting
the physician and the physician took control of the situation, the
same morass of liability questions arises. Under such legal con103
One Medical Attendant would be required per patient. Proposed Regulations, supra note 1, at 37,827.
10
4ld. at 37,828.
105
Id.
10
1It is uncertain (and beyond the scope of this article) what degree of

supervision might be considered reasonable based on radio contact alone.
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straints, a physician might well be hesitant to respond to a call
from the attendant.
These distinctions may be of little consequence or interest to
land ambulance services as they generally operate within a limited
range and therefore would not be expected regularly to undertake
interstate transportation of patients. Air ambulances, however, are
frequently called upon for the express purpose of making such
interstate trips with patients."" It is conceivable that the air ambulance could depart from a "borrowed servant" state (Texas), refuel
in a "finished product" state (Illinois) and then end the trip in a
"captain of the ship" state (Pennsylvania). If a negligent act was
committed by the medical attendant and the physician had assumed
control of the patient's care in Texas, but predictably lost radio
contact before the Illinois stop, how would the liability be allocated? Endless permutations of such problems in conflict of laws
are imaginable.
IV.

CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL

COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES

In the event that all of the parties involved in a lawsuit of the
nature described above resided in the same state and if the entire
flight was conducted within that state, no problems of competing
rules and laws would exist. The entire matter would be resolved
in that state's courts applying its own laws. As elements of the
case begin to involve interests of other states, such as parties who
are non-residents of the forum state or an interstate flight, decisions would have to be made as to which state's substantive laws
should apply. If the action were one in a state court, that court
would apply its conflict of laws rule to determine whether to apply
substantive law of the forum state or that of another state. In
situations involving residents of different states, however, lawsuits
frequently either begin in, or are removed to, federal court based
upon diversity of citizenship. For these cases, the Supreme Court
held in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that the law to be used is that
which would be applied by a state court of the state in which the
federal district court sits."' Therefore, the forum state's choice of
Interview with Alice Gaul, supra note 45.
"s Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'0
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laws rules would be used to determine which of several involved
states' substantive law to apply.'
Numerous choice of law standards have been devised and applied by state courts. In aviation tort litigation, however, courts
frequently use one of two basic conflict of laws standards. The
first is the lex loci delicti rule which applies the law of the state
in which the tort was committed."' This standard would be particularly difficult to apply for the interstate trips of air ambulances,
as the determination of exactly which state the aircraft was over
at the time of the injury could well be a matter of sheer speculation. In the example mentioned in the preceding section, the defendants (air ambulance, attendant and physician) would be collectively advocating that the state of occurrence be found as that
with the law most favorable to them as defendants generally.
At the same time, however, they would each be seeking application
of the law of that state which recognizes the liability allocation
theory most likely to exculpate that particular defendant. The
combination of uncertainty at the outset with that type of disharmony makes it very unlikely that any consistency could possibly
result.
A second standard commonly used is the "most significant relationship" test which applies the law of that state which has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties."' The
method of determining the relationships is to consider the contacts
which each state has with the occurrence and the parties. Included
are such factors as: (1) domicile, nationality, place of incorporation, place of business of the parties; (2) place where the relationship, if any, between the parties centered; and (3) issues and
character of the tort and relevant purposes of the tort rules of
interested states."' While this test may appear to be more logically
applicable, the complex relationships generally found in the aviation industry (such as domicile of the aircraft owners and passengers, place of departure and arrival, or place where the agree'09 Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
110 See Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 984 (1966).

" See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
"'Note, Aircraft Crash Litigation, 38 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 1052, 1053-55 &
n.5 (1970).
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ment was entered into) and the absence of any physical evidence
of the location of the incident can prevent conclusive determination not only of just which states are interested, but also of which
state in fact really has the most significant relationship."3 The
determination of applicable state law may therefore turn on factors otherwise totally unrelated to the negligent act itself, such as
domicile of the parties or place where the relationship centered.
The very nature of air ambulance services is such that it would not
be out of the ordinary for a Texas air ambulance to pick up in
Arkansas a patient (a Pennsylvania resident on vacation) to be
carried to a specialist in Illinois. If an injury occurred in flight,
use of the "most significant relationship" test might result in an
application of one state's law predicated only upon findings that
the carrier was a Texas business, the patient was a Pennsylvania
citizen, they first encountered each other in Arkansas and that
sometime before the air ambulance arrived in Illinois, an in-flight
negligent act occurred. In this type of case, the state found to be
most significantly related could in fact have only a very tenuous
or even a passive relationship to the incident.
Clearly, incongruous judgments will result from the battles over
applicable state law under either conflicts rule. The interstate nature of air ambulance services, however, demands that these carriers be similarly treated throughout the country to insure that no
geographical area is without air ambulance services simply because the relative potential liability is greater in one state than
in another. This possibility offers a compelling reason for the establishment of a uniform basis for malpractice actions which, by
necessity, would be a federal cause of action. The easiest and most
effective method would of course be legislation. A possible vehicle
for such federal legislation might be Senator McGovern's bill discussed in Part I(B) above. However, Congress has not responded
favorably to previous suggestions that they legislate a federal remedy for aviation tort litigation."' Another possibility for uniform
treatment would be the formulation of a federal common law
remedy. This would avoid both the imposition of state laws and the
113Id.

"" Sanders, The Tydings Bill, Symposium on Air Accident Investigation and
Litigation, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 550 (1970).
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conflict problems mandated by the Erie doctrine for diversity
cases." 5
Creation of a federal common law remedy by the courts is not
unprecedented in cases involving the aviation industry. In Kohr v.
Allegheny Airlines,"' the Seventh Circuit imposed a federal law
of contribution and indemnity in an action involving a mid-air
collision of two aircraft. The basis for finding this federal common
law remedy was the predominant federal interest in regulating airways.11 The court quoted from Justice Jackson's opinion in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,"' including the following:
Federal control is intensive and exclusive ....
only by federal permission, subject to federal
hands of federally certified personnel and under
of federal commands .... Its privileges, rights,
far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal
and not to any state government.""

Planes . . . move
inspection, in the
an intricate system
and protection, so
Government alone

Other courts have similarly found federal common law remedies in aviation tort litigation.'" Although Kohr has been distinguished by some courts in their decisions not to imply a federal
cause of action,' this generally has been either because the incident occurred outside of the United States,"' because it was a
totally intrastate incident,"' or because an agent of the United
States was a defendant which required application of the Federal
Tort Claims Act."' Likewise, the advisability of judicially estabErie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1' 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
17Id. at 403.
' 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
19Id. at 303.
"'See, e.g., Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978; Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppeson and Co., 440 F. Supp. 394 (D. Nev. 1977);
Hemphreys v. Tann, 13 Av. Cas. 18,229 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In Re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 69.F.R.D. 310 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Gabel v. Hughes
Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
' See, e.g., Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Co.,
No. 75-5915 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1978); Quadrini v. Sikorski Aircraft Div., United
Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1977); Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,
428 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Swanson v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 654
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
22Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Co., No.
75-5915 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1978).
13 Smith v. Cessna Aircraft, 428 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
"Swanson v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"'See
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lishing a federal common law for aviation tort litigation in general
has been addressed by several articles encouraging action by the
Supreme Court to validate the practice.1" However, even when
asked to imply a private right of action based upon a federal
statute, the Supreme Court has required that such implied federal
causes of action meet a four part test. In Cort v. Ash,1" the Court
set out four requirements for implying a private remedy under
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: first, whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class sought to be protected by the
statute; second, whether there is any evidence of Congressional
intent to either create or deny a remedy; third, whether implication of such a remedy would be consistent with the underlying
purpose of the statutory scheme; and finally, whether implication
of a federal remedy would be inappropriate because this is a cause
of action traditionally relegated to state law or involving an area
of state concern." ' Without attempting to predict what the Court's
exact disposition of either suggested federal common law remedies
or implied private rights of action based upon the Federal Aviation
Act or FAA regulations would be for aircraft litigation generally, or
air ambulance litigation specifically, it seems unwise to anticipate
that the Court will eagerly embrace the concept.
It seems, therefore, that the litigation difficulties caused by
different laws, rules and interpretations throughout the country are
certain to plague air ambulance services. If state laws are to apply,
the problem of determining which state arises. If a federal common
law or an implied private remedy lies, it must be determined
whether it will be uniformly applied throughout tlhe industry or
will only be applied to interstate flights. Whether by action of
Congress on a vehicle such as Senator McGovern's bill or by
decision of the Supreme Court, this confusion should be resolved
if air ambulance services are to be regulated effectively. Unquestionably, it would be preferable to have just one rule apply to an
12 See generally Note, The Case For A Federal Common Law Of Aircraft
Disaster Litigation: A Judicial Solution To A National Problem, 51 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 231 (1976); D. Prewitt, Federal Common Law of Aviation and the Erie

Doctrine, 40 J. Am L. & COM. 653 (1974); A. Keefe & G. DeValerio, Dallas,
Dred Scott and Eyrie Erie, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 107 (1972).
iN422
U.S. 66 (1975).
1I id. at 78.
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air ambulance flight whether the act occurs over Texas, Illinois,
Florida or Pennsylvania."'
V.

CONCLUSION

The FAA's proposed regulations for air ambulances would certainly be of value in helping to insure quality air ambulance service throughout the country. The FAA has done a commendable
job of weighing cost factors against idealistic professional desires.
Furthermore, Senator McGovern's proposed legislation, as presently drafted, will help to moderate the economic impact of the
regulations for the small certificate holders.
Nevertheless, regulation may create serious new problems of
tort liability and corresponding questions of application of state
or federal remedies. If some action is not taken to deal with a
federal liability allocation concept, those certificate holders who
attempt to provide air ambulance services may be thrown into a
quagmire of disputes over applicability of conflicting states' tort
laws, a federal common law or an implied federal right of action.
Under these circumstances, it would seem that proposal of uniform principles of liability allocation would be the best way for
the FAA both to protect the air ambulance industry and to insure
the availability of affordable air ambulance service throughout the
country.

128 "Moreover, insurers would be better able to predict their liability and
premium rates if a single rule is applicable." Hilliker, Vicarious Liability For
Aircraft Owners Under State Laws, supra note 59, at 1045.

